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Disparaging the Product-
Are the Remedies Reliable?
Edward L. Graf*
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
"Disparagement" is defined by the Restatement of the Law of Torts
as "matter which is intended by its publisher to be understood to cast
doubt upon the existence or extent of another's property in land, chat-
tels or intangible things, or upon their quality .. ."I The act has been
similarly designated as "Injurious Falsehood"2 and "Trade Libel."
Simply stated, it is "knocking the competitor," an act as old as com-
petitive business and one which takes on new significance in this age
of effective and far-reaching communications.
It is estimated that a single prime-time network television show,
with its accompanying commercials, will reach two hundred stations
with some twenty million viewing families. Many magazines attain cir-
culation of over ten million. With these media available as a forum,
and with the effectiveness of modern advertising it is clear that it is
necessary to protect the consumer from a misleading disparagement
that may affect his buying decision, as well as to protect the responsible
businessman from attack.
This problem has been recognized by many trade and professional
organizations,3 as well as organizations of broadcasters who have pro-
scribed this type of competitive conduct. The latter organizations,
through their member networks and stations have established clear-
* B.A., University of Pittsburgh, J.D., Duquesne University School of Law.
1. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 629 (1938).
2. W. PROSSER, TORTS §. 122, at 938 (3rd ed. 1964).
3. THE STANDARDS OF PRACrICE OF THE AMERICAN AssOCIATION OF ADVERTISING AGENCIES
provides that "It is unsound and unprofessional for the advertising agency to prepare or
handle any advertising of an untruthful or indecent character (including) statements which
tend to undermine an industry by attributing to its products, generally, faults and weak-
nesses true only of a few, and false statements or misleading exaggerations."
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ance procedures which enforce their codes. 4 However, none of these
organizations provide the machinery for a determination of the rights
of the parties, nor does the condemnation of any one of them preclude
the determined disparager from using another medium.
Historically the courts have been willing to recognize that there
should be liability for certain false and injurious statements affecting
individuals. The law of defamation has grown, based on the recognition
of the value of the individual's reputation, and has provided for pecu-
niary damages to reimburse the plaintiff for his loss. The courts have
generally compared a business' injury resulting from false statements
to defamation, and this reasoning has severely limited the responsive-
ness of the law. As stated by Prosser, discussing disparagement, "a
supposed analogy to defamation has hung over the tort like a fog."5
This unfortunate line of reasoning has severely restricted injunctive
relief because of the reluctance of courts of equity to suppress a libel.
The similarity to the treatment of defamation cases has also resulted
in the requirement of proof of actual damages in all but certain "per
se" defamation cases, thereby limiting the remedy.
The businessman whose product or company is being disparaged
usually opts for an early cessation of the activity. Monetary damages
are usually a concern secondary to stopping the disparagement and
useful as a deterrent to the offending conduct. When first recognized
by the English courts, the injury to business was held to constitute an
injury to property rather than to the persons reputation. The remedy
of the injunction was established to prevent a continuing injury. This
injunctive relief was later authorized by a statute permitting the Courts
of Chancery to try libels, and is the law of England today.6 But the
development of the law in the United States has resisted the use of
the equitable remedy of injunction, and as will be noted later, this
remedy is still limited.7 The legal remedy of compensatory damages
has also been limited, mainly through the difficulty of obtaining proof
of special damages.8
Most of the cases in the United States, by following the defamation
4. National Association of Broadcasters, THE TELEVISION .CODE (1969). The Code pro-
vides that advertising should offer a product or service on its positive merits and refrain
by identification or other means from discrediting, disparaging orunfairly attacking com-
petitors, competing products, other industries, professions or institutions.
5. W. PROSSER, TORTs, § 122 at 939 (3rd ed. 1964). .
6. 3 CALLMAN, UNfAiR COMPETITION § 39 (2d ed. 1950).
7. See generally, Developments in the Lau-Competitive Torts, 77 .HARv. L. REv. 888
(1964).
8. See generally, Note, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 394 (1965).
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analysis, have labeled the actions as libel or slander. In actions for dam-
ages they have required the proof of special damages unless there is a
showing that the disparagement is "libel per se" or unless there is a
showing that the libel has been of an individual as well as of the prod-
uct. The courts have generally strained to avoid the imputation of the
libel to an individual. Using a defamation analysis, injunctive relief has
often been denied in the interest of free speech and, because of the gen-
eral rule, the equity Will not enjoin the commission of a crime. Recent
developments in the recognition of the law of "Unfair Competition"
have provided encouragement for the injured party by reasoning that it
is not the libel itself, but rather the competitor's conduct which is en-
joined.9
Statutory restraints on disparagement include the Federal Trade
Commision Act'10 and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
The FTC polices business practices including false disparagement as
an "unfair or deceptive practice" under the Act. However, its juris-
diction is limited to interstate commerce and it has no duty to act
upon the urging of a businessman alleging wrongdoing. The Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act proposes to deal with the problems
faced by the plantiff in seeking relief by injunction, while it leaves
the law as to damages untouched. Both of the statutory restrictions
against disparagement will be analyzed in this article.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES DISPARAGEMENT?
Disparagement, while usually connected with publications by com-
petitors, is in no way limited to that situation. It may be committed by
a customer of the plaintiff who is upset with the quality of the goods
purchased," by a writer or film company who disparages a non-profit
organization, 12 by a union in its description of management's or by a
third party who has no business relationship with the plaintiff."
9. 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETMON § 39 (2d ed. 1950).
10. 38 STAT. 717 (as amended by 52 "STAT. III and 64 STAT. 1265); 15 U.S.C. 41.
11. West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 198 N.Y.2d 196 (1969). Here the action was
against the owner of a private residence who was picketing the office of the vender-realty
company.
12. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 260
N.Y. 167, 183 N.E. 284 (1932).
13. Montgomery Ward v. United Retail Employees, 400 IlL 38, 79 N.E.2d 46 (1948).
Note that this is an unusual case, generally the unions "right to free speech" is given
great latitude.
14. Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis Chalmers :Manufacturing Company, 7 App. Div.. 2d
441, 184 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1959).
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A. Subject Matter
The subject matter of the disparagement, as stated in the Restate'
ment of Torts, 15 is the "existence or extent of another's property in
(goods etc.)" and "their quality." The courts in dealing with interests
capable of disparagement have entertained a broad variety of cases.
Clearly a statement concerning the title to property can be disparag-
ing,16 as can statements concerning the quality, 7 composition,' 8 effec-
tiveness' 9 or price20 of the goods. Statements concerning the ethics,
2
'
existence,22 practices 23 or conduct 24 of the competitor have been held
to be disparaging. Practically anything that would interest a customer
or is capable of influencing his decision may be the subject of the
disparagement.2 5
Statements of Opinion
It is a long established maxim in the law of misrepresentation that
a certain amount of "seller talk" or "puffing" is permissible. It is
assumed by the courts that the public discounts the seller's expressions
of broad generality that do not state a fact or facts. Callman, in dis-
cussing misrepresentation states that:
if it is apparent to the average purchaser that the advertiser has
indulged in excessive hyperbole upon which one may not reason-
ably rely then the advertisement cannot be labeled false or mislead-
ing.26
The Restatement of Torts, in dealing with deceit, requires that the
recipient of a misrepresentation of opinion may rely upon represen-
tations of opinion based upon facts not disclosed, but requires that
the reliance be reasonable. The habit of vendors to exaggerate is noted
and it is stated that the "purchaser is justified in assuming that even
15. RF rATEMENT OF TORTS, § 629 (1938).
16. Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1951).
17. Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 P.157 (1891).
18. Geary v. Bennett, 53 Wis. 444, 10 N.W. 602 (1881).
19. Dust Sprayer Mfg. Co. v. Western Fruit Grower, 126 Mo. App. 139, 103 S.W. 566
(1907).
20. Samson United Corp. v. Dover Mfg. Co., 233 App. Div. 15S, 251 N.YS. 466 (1931).
21. Pfeifly v. Henry, 269 Pa. 533, 112 A. 768 (1921).
22. Dudley v. Briggs, 141 Mass. 582, 6 N.E. 717 (1886).
23. Great South-Western Collection Corp. v. Rosoff, 40 Misc. 2d 121, 242 N.Y.S.2d
678 (1963).
24. Puget Sound Navigation Co. v. Carter, 233 F. 832 (W.D. Wash. 1916).
25. 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43.2(b) (2d ed. 1950)..
26. 2 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19.2(b)(2) (2d ed. 1950).
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his vendor's opinion has some basis of fact and therefore in believing
that the vendor knows of nothing which makes his opinion fantastic." 2 7
This reasoning has been applied to disparagement and protected those
whose statements, though derogatory, were of opinion only. As in the
famous case of White v. Mellin,2 Lord Herschel's reluctance to permit
the court to become a mechanism for judicial determination of the
better product is still alive.29 However, the courts are willing to
closely review the statements and look for assertions of fact.80 The
"unfavorable comparison" rule laid down by White v. Mellin3' is not
absolute and does not preclude disparagement in all comparisons.32
Therefore, it appears that statements of "opinion" that may be proven
by test or surveys and statements of objective facts will not be permit-
ted an exemption from a disparagement action on the basis that they
are "puffing."
Statements of Fact
Throughout the analysis of whether certain conduct constitutes
disparagement, the paramount problem is one of characterizing that
disparagement as the type which will enable the grant of relief. Under
the present state of the law it has been noted that the requirement of
many courts of establishing libel per se or proving special damages
presents the injured party with some very practical problems in ob-
taining relief.
The determination of whether the alleged disparagement is a state-
ment of fact, rather than opinion, is often difficult. When the defendant
quotes a performance figure such as "only 40% as effective"33 or makes
a positive statement-such as "(plaintiff) is out of business,"34 there is
no doubt that he is stating ascertainable facts. But as the defendant's
27. RESrATEMENT OF TORTS § 539 (1938).
28. White v. Mellin (1895) A.C. 154.
29. Testing Systems Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286 (1966).
30. George v. Blow, 20 N.S.W. 395 (1899); Jarrahdale Timber Co. v. Temperly & Com-
pany, 1894, 11 T.L.R. 119.
31. Supra note 28.
32. Testing Systems Inc. v. Magnaflux Corporation, 251 F. Supp. 286 (1966). In this
case plaintiff and defendant competed in the manufacture of equipment, systems and
chemical products and defendants conduct included such substantive claims as
"(plaintiffs product) only 40% as effective as (defendant's)" and "the government is
throwing them out." Clearly these were factual claims and defendants defense of
"unfavorable comparison" was promptly dismissed.
33. Id.
34. Dudley v. Briggs, 141 Mass. 582, 6 N.E. 717 (1886); Davis v. New England R. Pub.
Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909).
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Statements move into the area where they appear .to-be Opinion-, but
also intimate their backing with facts, the court is faced with a difficult
analysis.3 5
There is no remedy for a true but disparaging statement of fact. As
Caliman succinctly puts it: "As the law stands today, truth is a com-
plete defense."8 6 This is so even though the derogatory statement may
concern past acts of the plaintiff such as crimes committed as a youth, 7
so long as those crimes have some bearing upon the current dealings.
This rule may be subject to exception when the actions fall within the
category of "unfair competition." The. true statement: of a competitor's
misconduct which is not connected with the bargain at hand could be
characterized as competition not "according to the rules of the game'."
In the interest of aiding the prospective customer, to deal on the merits
of the product, this would be appropriate. Similarly, there are some
recent indications that if the true statement is motivated solely on the
intentional infliction of harm, there should be a remedy.8  The basis
of this claim is the "prima facie tort," a so-called "new tort" recog-
nizing a wrong not covered by "traditional torts." In order to be
actionable in this instance, the harm must result from an unmixed
motive to inflict injury, and the act must be withoutjustification.89
Where there is a legitimate purpose there is -no liability, and acts done
in furtherance of business have been held to be for A' "legitimate pur-
pose," 40 limiting the use of the doctrine in competititve situations.41
35. See generally, Note, Misrepresentation of Opinion: Statement of Fact Distinguished
from Statement of Opinion, 28 B.U.L. Rrv. 352 (1948).
36. 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43.1(a) (2d ed. 1950).
37. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 684 (1940).
38. Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 808,
187 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1959). The court reviewed the alleged utterance of false information
which had been given to the Internal Revenue Service by the defendant. The information
led to plaintiff's indictment for tax evasion. While finding that the information was not
given maliciously and with intention to harm plaintiff, they stated that "usually the
utterance of a truth does not provide a basis for redress and imports no wrongdoing and
consequently is not actionable, unless, as in prima facie tort, the sole motivation is the
intentional infliction of harm resulting in damage." The court here cited the REsTATE MENT
OF TORS § 873 (1938), which provides that "A person who, with knowledge of its falsity,
makes an untrue statement concerning another which he realizes will harm the other is
liable to the other for such resulting harm as he should have realized might be caused
by his statement."
39. Miller v. Kornella, Corporation, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 675 (1962); Ruza v. Ruza; 146 N.Y.S.
2d 808 (1955).
40. Id., Glenn v. Advertising Publications Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Defen-
dant publisher of AD AGE magazine published an allegedly Talse survey of media buying
influences. The statements, found true, were said to be for "mixed motives," negating
"prima facie tort."
41. But see, Morrison v. NBC, 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 266. N.Y.S.2d 466 (1965). This case
was not competitive conduct, but again recognized a remedy for the wrongful conduct of
168
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Falling within the category of truthful non-actionable disparage-
ment are a long line of cases involving notification of, or threatened
action on defendant's patent, copyright or trademark. The courts rec-
ognize the right of the patentee to give such notice, absent bad faith.42
To avoid the element of bad faith, all that is required is that a patent
actually exists and that the allegedly infringing acts have either oc-
curred or are threatened. 43 For this purpose, a duly issued patent is
considered presumptively valid.4 4
As stated before, actionable disparagement consists of the publication
of false statements of fact which tend to demean another's title in
goods; the quality of the goods; the conduct of the competitor's busi-
ness; or the competitor himself. A great many cases have interpreted
specific acts as disparagement and certain types of conduct may be cited
as representative.
4 5
Product Characterized as Unsafe, Unhealthy or Illegal-Examples
include the statement that the use of a competitive fly-spray was
"subject to government seizure" and "could be fined for selling"; 46
Use of a competitive product was a violation of trademark rights
and illegal.4
7
Conduct or Integrity of the Business or Its Principles-Examples
include printed article that bank had misposted certain checks and
apparently committed a larceny; 48
Competitor's computing scale which falsely weighed meat was pub-
licized; 49
"Barnum's statement of fifty years ago can be applied even at the
present time" when applied to competitor's sale of ineffective
medicine;5 0
prima facie tort, stating again the requirement that the activity be without economic or
social justification. The action of the network in inducing the plaintiff to perform on a
rigged TV quiz show and to thus suffer damage to his academic reputation was said to
be "unjustified." This Inotwithstanding the business idvantage gained by the network-
analogous to business advantage of disparaging the competitor.
42. Glott v. Notion Accessories Inc., 129 F. Supp. 297. (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Kaplan v.
Helenhard Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1950); Royal Die Cutting & Heat Sealing
Corp. v. Duro Pen Co., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y 1963).
43. Q-Tips Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845 (D.C.N.J; 1952), afl'd 206 F.2d
144 (3rd Cir. 1953).
44. Biuen'v. Huff, 100 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
45. See generally, the exhaustive list of specific conduct, 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR CoMSrri-
TION § 43.1(b) (2d ed. .1950). -
'46. Allen Manufacturing Co. .v. Smith, 224 App.. Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S..692 (1928).
47. Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1951).
-48. First National Bank of Waverly v. Winters, 22S N.Y. 47, 121 N.E. 459 (1918).
49. Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 142 F. 919 (6th Cir. 1906)..
50. Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v.: Jensen Salsbery .Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255 (8th
Cir. 1926).
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Movie depicting plaintiff's factory as a "white slave" waystation; 5'
Improper conduct in obtaining criminal actions by a non-profit
organization. 52
Financial Difficulty or Discontinuance of Business-Examples in-
clude corporation in serious financial difficulty, lacked credit;5 3
Plaintiff could not continue in business, lost all of its competent
men;54
Lack of Effectiveness or Poor Quality of Product-Examples in-
clude "rifle jams, wears out prematurely"; 55
"I bought a home from this builder-before you buy see mine"
implying that it was of poor quality;56
Statements that newspaper was not a general newspaper and its
publication was not suitable for legal notices; 57
Advertisements referring to competitor's film development-
"Hurry and ruin snapshots,". "Use inferior chemicals."58
Title of Product or Other Property-Examples include assertion
of lien against land.59
Comparative advertising has provided considerable controversy. The
forcefulness of a side by side, "see for yourself" type advertisement is
considerable and in recent years many advertisers have been inclined
to make use of this type of ad, notwithstanding the free publicity given
to the competitor.6 0 Because of the power of this type of advertising,
a strict standard of truthfulness and use of meaningful comparisons
should be required. To some extent the courts have recognized this,
51. Merle v. Sociological Film Corp., 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915).
52. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice v. MacFadden Publication Inc., 260
N.Y. 167, 183 N.E. 284 (1932).
53. Wayne Works v. Hicks Body Co., 115 Ind. App. 10, 55 N.E. 2d 382 (1944).
54. Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N.Y.S. 44 (1924). See also, Dovis v.
New England RY Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909); ommission of a valid sup-
plier from a list purporting to list-all reputable suppliers.
55. Marlin Firearms C. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E.'163 (1902).
56. West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, .198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1969).
57. La Massena v. Storm, 62 App. Div. 150, 70 N.Y.S. 882 (1901).
58. Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop Inc. v.' Pane, 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962).
59. Cronkhite v. Chaplin, 282 F. 579 (10th Cir..1922).
60. Four A's Warns of Increase in Disparaging Ads, ADVERTISING AGE, March 24, 1969.
Noting this increase, the American Association of Advertising Agencies Committee On
Improving Advertising issued a policy statement condemning the practice, stating that the
committee "believes advertising should present positive information in persuasive ways,
using positive appeals. We are not against any and all comparisons, but it is easy for
positive 'comparison' to slip over into negative 'disparagement'. The line is not always
precise."
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but a certain amount of latitude is still permitted within "unfavorable
comparison" of matters of opinion.
Comparative statements take many forms, but in all cases, the use
of the plaintiff's name, product or description is for the purpose of
either intimating that defendant's product is as good as plaintiff's or
that plaintiff's is inferior. Without this there would be no purpose in
drawing the comparison. Accordingly, falsely representing that your
product is equivalent to the plaintiff's has been recognized as dispar-
aging,"' and advertisements that a product was "identically the same
product," when false, were held to be actionable. 62 Merely listing the
products of the plaintiff beside the defendant's was not held to imply
that they were identical when the purpose was to provide size com-
parisons in a price list.63
Side by side visual comparisons, when false, are particularly dam-
aging, and a false store window display of both the defendant's and
plaintiff's gym shorts, along with critical remarks were held to be dis-
paraging. 64 In O.A. Business Publications v. Davidson Publishing
Co., 5 however, a brochure presented a photographic reproduction of
pages 2 and 3 of both plaintiff's and defendant's periodical publica-
tions, with a list of questions pointing out the superiority of defen-
dant's publication. The presentations were clearly factual, both being
photocopies, but they were only two pages of multipage (40) publica-
tions and the plaintiff argued that they were not representative of his
product. The court, finding no falsity, held that the advertisement was
not actionable. This type of case points up the inherent limitations in
the libel analysis of disparagement cases. There is no doubt that a
manufacturer will be injured if samples of his product that are not
representative of the whole are displayed in a derogatory comparison.
A clever competitor can always find weak areas of the product which
alone do not make a legitimate comparison. Yet in the search for libel,
the courts have difficulty with such a truthful statement of fact. 66
61. See also, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 761 (1938), which recognizes the liability of
one who diverts trade from a competitor by making false representations of the qualities
of his goods, which are, in fact, possessed by his competitors goods.
62. Carolina Aniline and Extract Co. v. Ray Chemical Company, 221 N.C. 269, 20
S.E.2d 59 (1942). The court here spoke in terms of "unfair competition", rather than
"disparagement".
63. National Welding and Engineering Co. v. Hammon Precision Engineering Co.,
165 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
64. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. A.2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939).
65. 0. A. Business Publications v. Davidson Publishing Co., 334 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964).
66. Similarly, claims which are untrue, but not libelous have been held not to be
actionable-e.g. "most listened to station" was held to be non-libelous and untruthfulness
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Statements of comparison falsely listing the defects of plaintiff's prod-
uct and the merits of defendant's have been held disparagement, 67
while comparisons of competing systems rather than specific compet-
itors have been permitted more latitude.6 8
D. Means of Disparagement
The means of the disparagement may be written or spoken, by
picture or display.69 It need not directly refer to the plaintiff or his
product so long as it is reasonably understood to refer to him.7 0 The
various methods used have involved oral statements, signs, movies,
print and broadcast ads, handbills-virtually every media.
III. REMEDIES
Injunction
Businessmen, injured by disparagement, will opt first for an early
cessation of the injurious conduct on the assumption that they will
do best in battling their competitors in the market place rather than
the legal area. They instinctively realize that the asset known as "good-
will" is composed of years of performance for customers and of good
work in the community and that it requires considerably less to destroy
than to build. Accordingly, the remedy sought is frequently injunc-
tion.
American Courts have traditionally been reluctant to place prior
restraints upon free speech, even when the speech was defamatory. In
Vulcan Detinning Co.,7 1 the court explained that "injunction is an
extraordinary remedy and where human liberty is involved the writ
should be used with great caution." Similar caution was urged in
Montgomery Ward v. United Retail Employees7 2 when constitutional
could not make it so--see Hornell Broadcasting Corp. v. Nielson Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 60,
185 N.Y.S. 2d 945 (1959). This case involved two competing radio stations and the defen-
dant had based its claim on a survey taken by the co-defendant. The statements were
said not to hold plaintiff up to ridicule, scorn or contempt or impugn reputation, manage-
ment or credit. Note the dicta *concerning possible'unfair competition and negating prima
fade tort.
67. Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane,-408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962).
68. Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric Co-op., 289 S.W. 2d 93 (1956).
69. 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COM'PETrrION § 43.3 (2d ed. 1950)..
70. Id. at § 432(e).
71. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, 315 Ill. 40, 145 N.E. 657 at 658.
72. 46 Ill. 38, 79 N.E.2d 46 (1948).
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rights were. involved. The court- cited the constitutional guaranty of
free speech and right of trial by jury, and stated that the acts were of
defamation, not disparagement. Thus there could be no injunctive
relief since such relief would be a prior restraint upon free speech.
This reluctance to apply injunctive relief has been followed by the
New York courts and in Mauger v. Dick73 it was succinctly stated that
equity does not extend to libel or slander. A similar result was reached
in Kidd v. Horry74 where the court quoted from Malins, V.C. in
Thornley's Castle-Food Co. v. Masson75:
I think these cases at law establish this doctrine: that where one
man publishes that Which is injurious to another in his trade or
business, that publication is actionable, and, being actionable, will
be stayed by injunction, because it is a wrong which ought not be
repeated.
They announced that no well-considered judgement of this country
had introduced this new branch of equity and refused to do so.
This same result was reached by other jurisdictions.7 6 The often cited
case of Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields77 was decided in 1902 to further
reinforce the rule. In this case the plaintiff was a manufacturer of a
repeating rifle who had for some time advertised its rifle in defendant's
magazine. When defendant raised his rates, plaintiff withdrew its
advertising. Thereupon defendent began to publish spurious letters
purporting to have been volunteered by readers. The letters were de-
rogatory of the rifle, charging that it would fire prematurely and was
inferior to other rifles of similar price. The lower court in reviewing
the case decided in favor of the plaintiff, granting an injunction on
the grounds that although equity may not restrain a libel where the
attack is purely personal, like an attack on character or reputation, it
could restrain a publication to protect the rights of property when
such publication would inflict irreparable harm and when an action
at law was inadequate. On reversal the court refused equity jurisdic-
tion when the party had an adequate remedy at law, even though the
remedy might be worthless because of the special damage requirements
-citing the constitutional guaranty of free-speech and the need to
have libel decided by a jury.
73. 55 How. Pr. 132 (1878).
74. 28 F. 773 (1886).
75. 14 Ch. Div. 763.
76. Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 19 Am. R. 310 (1873); Marx
& Haas-Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, :168 Mo. 133, 67 S.W. 391 (1901).
77. 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
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. This strict approach was not followed in Davis v. New England RY
Pub. Co. 7 8 It was a case involving competitors and the court character-
ized the competitive conduct as a "false and misleading publication
interfering with business, not technically a libel," recognizing the
embryo "unfair competition" action.
The New York court in Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products9
followed a similar analysis granting injunction and accounting for
profits. The defendant was in a competitive capacity and had made
statements that plaintiff "couldn't continue in business" and "wasn't
honest in dealing with customers." Then in 1928 the New York court
heard Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith"0 , another competitive case with the
defendant making false statements and writings regarding plaintiffs pro-
duct. Citing Dean Pound's famous quotation,81 they distinguished
Marlin as libel, rather than unfair competition, and the injunction was
granted. Here the court analyzed the case as "unfair competition"
rather than simply a libel as in Marlin. The case reinforced the growing
willingness of equity to provide a remedy, provided there was com-
petition and damage to property.
In Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Assn. Inc. 2 the circuit court rec-
ognized the authority of the federal courts to grant the remedy of in-
junction when an unfair competition is perpetrated. In its review, the
court compared the relevant domestic law to relevant foreign law. Again
the case was a competitive case with the disparaging statements having
been made continuously and systematically. The Court distinguished the
"pure trade libel" from the trade libel which was accompanied by the
usual acts of unfair competition such as "passing-off" and trademark in-
fringement. Constrained by the Delaware law which did not permit
injunctive relief for "pure trade libel," the case was decided on the
broader unfair competition issue.
78. 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909) case involving the omission of plaintiff express
company from a list of "reputable" local expresses published by defendant.
79. Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N.Y.S. 44 (1921).
80. 224 App. Div., 187 N.Y. (1928). Competitive products were "So-Bos-So" cattle fly
spray manufactured by the plaintiff and "E-Z-Bos" by the defendant. Defendants state-
ments included "they could be fined by selling" and "subject to government seizure."
See also Old Investors v. Jenkins, 232 N.Y.S. 245 (1928), aff'd 225 App. Div. 860, 233 N.Y.S.
845 (1929).
81. "In substance the traditional doctrine puts anyone's business at the mercy of any
insolvent malicious defamer who has sufficient imagination to lay out a skillful campaign
of extortion." 29 HARv. L.R. 640, 668.
82. 129 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1941). In this case the defendants were a trade group of
mahogany dealers and had called the plaintiffs (dealers in Philippine Mahogany) unethical
and deceptive.
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A 1946 New York case involving a radio show which omitted the
plaintiff's song from its list of the top ten, resulted in no injunction.
Marlin was cited as the rule, albeit criticized.83 Later cases appear to
follow the distinction between competitive and non-competitive cases,
granting the remedy of injunction in the former only when there are
compelling circumstances . 4 A general reluctance has been exhibited to
invoke the remedy absent some other ground such as breach of trust,
coercion or conspiracy.8 5 Pennsylvania follows the doctrine of Kidd v.
Horrys6 with some indication that if the libel is so clear as to be con-
ceded, or already established by the verdict of a jury, equity may invoke
the remedy of injunction.8 7 The courts still have a great deal of move-
ment to reach the point where injunction is an adequate remedy.88 The
analysis as "unfair competition," comparing disparagement to "passing-
off" seems logical, but has been slow in developing. There is little
difference in effect between the unfair and disparaging comparison, and
the act of selling goods as those of another since each causes an economic
injury. Both acts should be termed "unfair competition".
B. Damages
The plaintiff seeking monetary damages resulting from a disparage-
ment will immediately confront the problem of proving the damages.
The established rule is that in disparagement cases, absent libel per se,
the plaintiff must prove "special damages." This rule has its basis in the
analogy between trade libel and defamation and requires that actual
pecuniary loss be proven and shown to be the direct and natural con-
sequence of the defamatory communication. The proof required is
83. Advance Music Corp. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946), rev'd,
268 App. Div. 707, 53 N.Y.S.2d 337 following a "prima facie tort" reasoning, the court
stated that the intentional inflection of harm required a justification.
84. Shutzman & Shutzman v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 827 (1969), where
law partners sought to enjoin the publication of a book purporting to tell how to protect
your legal rights and implying that lawyers were not trustworthy-no injunction. The court
said that "the drastic remedy of injunction should not be granted . . . in the absence of
compelling circumstances." Compare West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 198 N.Y.S.2d
196, where injunction was granted against a home owner picketing the construction firm
which had sold him a home, when he had a suit pending in the matter.
85. Robert E. Hicks Corp. v. National Salesman's Training Association, 19 F.2d 963 (7th
Cir. 1927).
86. 28 F. 773 (1886). See also, W. R. Oyer Inc. v. Waynesboro Industrial Development
Corp., 6 Adams L.J. 127 (Pa. Com. PI 1964).
87. Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. 386, 51 A. 1024 (1902). Statements
of plaintiff insurance company's competitor that plaintiff was "going out of the sick
benefits business" not clearly libelous. But see, Kershes v. Verbicues, 36 D&E 499 (1939),
where a neighbor's continuous loud and rancorous slander was enjoined.
88. A fuller discussion of the Uniform Deceptive Table Practices Act is noted later
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specification of- both the particular customers and the. property involved
in the prospective sales lost as -a result of the defendant's statements.8 9
The result of this requirement is that the more sophisticated the busi-
ness, the more difficult it is to satisfy the-damage proof requirements."
As the business increases in size and complexity, and if the plaintiff is a
national or regional seller, it becomes more and more difficult for him
to compile a list of lost customers. In contrast to the small storekeeper,
he often does 'not-note the loss of customers immediately, nor recall
their name or their reasons for terminating their business with him.
An exception to this harsh rule has been for disparagement which
amounts to "libel per se." Again using the analogy to defamation, the
courts have reasoned that certain statements, like libel or slander per
se are clearly financially injurious and require no proof of damages-
damages may be inferred. This concept has been applied where the
words "directly impeach the integrity, knowledge, skill, diligence or
credit" of the plaintiff.91 Similarly, a plaintiff who can show that the
defamation affected him personally may establish libel per se.
The characterization of an act as libel per se has been a difficult
question for the courts and many conflicting holdings have resulted
from similar factual situations.92 There is general agreement that mere
disparagement of the manufacturer's goods will not constitute libel per
se. 93 But, if the statement touches the plaintiff in his "office, profession
or trade" a different result is reached. 94
The basis of this rule is that if the criticism is not only of the product
but also such that the manufacturer is accused of misrepresenting the
.product or using fraud or deceit in its marketing, it is an attack upon
his personality. A corporation, as well as an individual, is said to be
vested with a "personality" which may be libeled,9 5 as can a non-profit
corporation..
It is difficult to reconcile the cases or provide more than the most
89. Hunt Oil Co. v. Berry, 227 Misc. 234, 86 So.2d 7 (1956).
* 90. See generally, Note, Trade Libel and Its Special Damage Requirement 17 HAST. L.J.
394 (1965).
91. Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shield, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
92. See generally, 3 CALLMAN UNFAM COMPETITION § 43.1 (2d ed. 1950).
93. Le Massena v.- Storm, 62 App. Div. 150, 70 N.Y.S. 882 (1901), holding that state.
ments that the Wall Street Journal was not a "general newspaper" and that advertise-
ments in it were -not acceptable to the courts was critical of the product only-not libel
per se. Neither would statements such as "the dinner," "was wretched" and "served in a
manner that hungry barbarians might object" be libel per se.
94. Id.
95. Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop Inc. v. Pane, 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962).
96. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice v. MacFadden Publications Inc., 260
N.Y.: 167; 183 N.E. 284(1932). • .
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general guidelines, but an examination of some of the cases provides
some guidance. In the leading case of Marlin Firearms7 the derogatory
statements charging that plaintiff's rifle was defective and of low qual,
ity were considered disparagement of the product only. The court
stated that the disparagements did not charge plaintiff with deceit in
vending or want of skill in manufacturing-they did not "directly im-
peach the integrity, knowledge, skill, diligence or credit of the plaintiff,
the words are not actionable unless special damages are proved." The
reader may find difficulty in reaching the conclusion that one accused
of selling a dangerous instrumentality such as a defective rifle is not
suffering an attack against his integrity. Similarly in Erlich v. Etner,98
the charge that a dealer in kosher meats dealt in non-kosher products
was not held to be libel per se., Contrast this with a case involving a
side by side comparison of gym shorts with a claim that the plaintiff's
shorts lost 25% in weight after laundering, thereby depicting them as
wrinkled and shoddy.99 The court found that the actions went further
than to criticize the goods and imputed fraud and deception to the
plaintiff-seller. They were held to be libel per se.
Statements referring to the plaintiff's method of doing business when
they are libelous and adversely affect him in such trade or business
have been considered libel per se. For example, calling the company
president "a cheap chiseler and crook" whose company had "short
weighted customers"'100 was libel per se, as was the charging of im-
proper activities by a non-profit corporation. 10 A different result was
reached when the mentioning of the name of plaintiff's corporation in
an article entitled "Don't Fall for Mail Frauds."' 02 Nor was the article
referring to plaintiff's drug as "merely sugar and bran" and stating that
"P.T. Barnum's statement of 50 years ago can be applied even at the
present time." The courts have generally recognized that the imputa-
tion of dealing in goods which could cause physical injury due to their
defects, is libel per se and there are numerous examples of cases where
the libel has been that the shopkeeper dealt in poisonous foods. 03
97. Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shield, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
98. 224 Cal. App. 2d 69, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1964).
99. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 86 P.2d 602 (1939).
100. Texas Plastics v. Roto-Lith, Ltd., 250 F.2d-844 (5th Cir. 1958).
101. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice v. MacFadden Publications Inc., 260
N.Y. 167, 183 N.E. 284 (1932).
102. Drug Research Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 166 N.E.2d 319 (1960). The fact
situation involved an article on reducing drugs which listed the plaintiff's company as an
'example of the fraud.
103. Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 P. 157 (1891); Brooks v. Harrison, 91 N.Y. 83
(1883); Panster v. Wasserman, 190 App. Div. 827, 180 N.Y.S. 718 (1920).
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I The Pennsylvania court, in the case of Cosgrove Studio and Camera
Shop Inc. v. Pane,104 considered the competitive advertising of the de-
fendant who replied to the plaintiff-competitor's offer to provide a new
roll of film free for each brought in for development. An accompanying
ad implied that plaintiff used inferior chemicals, blurred prints and
ruined snapshots. 05 The court found the statements to be libel per se
because of their imputation of want of integrity but continued the recog-
nition of the special damage requirement in cases other than libel per se.
In the District Court case of Testings Systems Inc. v. Magnaflux'0 the
court could not find libel per se in competitive claims that plaintiff's
product was only 40% as effective and the "government is throwing
them out," finding that the disparagement dealt only with the product.
In considering the strict special damage rule the court noted its harsh-
ness, but was compelled by Cosgrove to continue its application.
The hardships worked by the special damage requirement have led
the advocates for the injured plaintiffs to try approaches alternative to
libel. One approach has been the so-called "prima facie tort" discussed
previously. In Morrison v. NBC,0 7 general damages were held to be
sufficient, but this Was a non-competitive case and involved an act
(rigging a T.V. show) without social or business justification. A later
district court case in the same jurisdiction involving a case of com-
petitive disparagement did not get to the damage issue, but noted that
New York law was unclear as to whether proof of special damages would
be required.10 8 The difficulties in applying the "prima facie tort" to
competitive cases (because of the purpose of furtherance of business
rather than pure malice) probably serve to limit the use of the doctrine
in disparagement cases.
In summary, it must be observed that the oft-criticized special damage
rule is still generally the law in this country. Although there have been
limited incursions into it,109 the rule has lost none of its vitality and it
appears doubtful that continued assault on the basis of libel will change
this.
104. 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962).
105. Id.
106. '251 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
107. .24 App. Div. 284, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (1965); a non-competitive case--damages to
reputation from appearing on a rigged TV show.
.. 108. Glenn v. Advertising Publications Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
109.' Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 839 111. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949). Plaintiff had
painted the first portrait of Harry S. Truman, and defendant credited it to someone else.
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IV. 'STA-tUTORY REGULATION
An act of disparagement may come within the regulatory activities
of the Federal Trade Commission and is covered by the Uniform De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act where adopted. 110 Other acts, such as the
"Printers Ink" statutes based on criminal sanctions have hadvery little
use.
A. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC, as one of the federal bodies dealing with business prac-
tices, has the duty of enforcing the Federal Trade Commission Act.-
The Act provides the basic governmental regulation of advertising and
other trade practices. Section 5(a)(1) of the act prohibits "unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in commerce""' and these acts and practices
have been broadly defined to include advertising, labeling and other
communications, among the broad range of business practices. The
commission, in its reviewing of practices has closely reviewed com-
parisons and disparagement for deception. Under the act it has investi-
gatory powers and through its "complaint" and "cease and desist"
order proceedings may obtain an order with injunctive powers. There
is a right of appeal to a United States Court of Appeals. Upon the
violation of a final order, penalties of up to $5,000 may be imposed
for each violation and each day of continuing violation may be deemed
a separate offense." 2
False or deceptive comparisons of a product with that of another
have been held unfair under the act, as have disparagements. In inter-
preting the act, the commission strives for truth as the consumer would
view it."' Unhampered by the libel analogy followed by common-law,
the test has been whether the statements have a tendency to-mislead
and deceive a substantial number of persons and induce them to'buy
goods upon that basis."14
The FTC has found disparagement to be an unfair practice in most
of the same types of conduct as are similarly treated under the common
110. See, infra note 127.
111. 15 USC 41, "unfair methods of competition, in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."
112. CCH TRADE REG. REP. 7500.
113. Baum, Truthful Disparagement under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 51
Trademark Rptr. 1081 (1961).
114. Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941).
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law. False statements that a competitor had-gone out of business and
was in the hands of a finance company were unfair.115 Statements made
to prospective customers by salesmen and distributors, falsely stating
that a competitive product would "crack and stick" and that it would
not be "passed by the engineers" were the subject of a cease and desist
order.116 in several cases false statements made by stainless steel manu-
facturers that an aluminum type of utensil would cause various physical
ailments were held unfair."x These types of statements, utilizing fear
in the sale of products have been considered particularly closely. 118 The
statement need not be continuous or extend over a long period of time
to support an unfair competition charge-a single act is enough."19
Statements made by salesmen, as well as by officers, are covered by the
Act and the company is responsible for them.120
Comparisons to other products, even if not named, are unfair prac-
tices if false and deceptive. The deception may be by innuendo, such
as making a true statement of fact which leads the reader to believe
that another fact is necessarily true when it may not be true. In the
case of National Bakers Services Inc. v. FTC'21 the producer of Holly-
wood Bread had advertised that its bread was low calorie food; lower
in calories than ordinary breads and had "up to 42% more protein."
In fact, a slice of Hollywood Bread had the same amount of protein
as a slice of "ordinary" bread, the greater amount of protein occurred
only if an equal quantity of bread was compared. In upholding the
FTC, the court stated that the meaning of an ad is a question of fact
and an important criterion in determining its meaning is the "net
impression that it is likely to make on the general populace."
The growth of popularity of television and the ingenuity of adver-
tising agencies in its use led to a whole line of comparison/disparage-
ment cases in this new medium. The FTC recognizes that the visual
115. Majestic China et al., 38 F.T.C. 786 (1939).
116. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 29 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1928).
117. Steelco Stainless Steel Inc. v. F.T.C., 187 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1951).
118. Id.; In the Matter of Eversharp, 57 F.T.C., 841 (1960), consent decree against a
TV commercial implying that old style razors were dangerous, by a demonstration of
cutting a boxing glove. But see, International Parts Corporation v. FTC, 133 F.2d 883
(7th Cir. 1943), where the advertisement was "protect yourself against leaking carbon
monoxide gas, be sure your muffler is made with continuous electric-welded seams through-
out-not locked, crimped or spot welded"-upheld, despite the lack of evidence that the
electric welded muffler has less danger of leakage. This case stands out for its permissive
allowance of "scare" copy writing.
119. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1928); Fox Film Corp. v. FTC,
296 F. 55 (2nd Cir. 1924)-distinguishes the Sherman Act requirements of general practice.
120. Perma Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941); Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
124 F.2d 640 (3rd Cir. 1941).
121. 329 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1964).
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comparison has great power. In a television advertisement for. razors
and blades a comparison was used very effectively.122 The advertisement
showed a boxer (a heavyweight champion) holding two razors in his
gloved hands-a well known sportscaster looked on. The boxer per-
formed a demonstration by pulling the razors, each in turn, across the
gloves, severely cutting the one glove with the "old style razor, while
the Shick caused no damage." The FTC asserted that the demonstration
was disparaging of the competitive razor because it portrayed a' danger
that was not actual since the staged condition was not actual. The ad
had the capacity to unduly alarm and frighten prospective purchasers
of competitive razors. A consent order was accepted in the case and the
FTC's intent to require relevant demonstrations was made clear.
Another consent order required the cessation of a demonstration
in which a skindiver with a heavy beard dove into the water and demon-
strated the ability of the advertiser's shaving cream to maintain its
lather while others dissipated under water. The FTC asserted that by
cupping his hands only while using the advertiser's product, the skin-
diver presented an unfair demonstration. 23
Next the FTC took on the bete noir of television advertising-the
"mock-up." The photographic deficiencies of television technology posed
some problems for the advertiser in displaying his product as it really
should appear. Very often the televised product looked quite different
from the actual product, i.e. the product was not one which would retain
its characteristics under filming or televising conditions. The solution
was the "mock-up," a simulation of the product designed to show the
actual attributes of the product on the TV screen. The Commission
was adamant in its opposition to these displays which they felt to be
inherently deceptive. One of the Commission's early attacks was di-
rected at a television demonstration of pressurized shaving creams.
The competitive shaving cream was actually a mocked-up "special
formula." The cream promptly dried upon release. In fact, there were
several other shaving creams which would perform as well as the ad-
vertiser's product, and the use of the mock-up was the cause of the
poor performance of the competitive creams. While upholding mock-
ups as proper when the only untruth is the mock-up itself, the court
122. In the Matter of Eversharp, 57 FTC 841 (1960). It should be noted that a consent
order is not an admission of guilt, but rather a procedure for settling the complaint.
123. In the Matter of the Mennen Co., 58 FTC 675 (1960). See also, In the Matter-_of
Standard Brands Inc., 56 FTC 1488 (1960) moisture drops .("flavor gems')--actually drops
of non-volatile liquid applied for the demonstration-were applied to the advertiser's
margarine, but not to the competitive brand.
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held the particular demonstration to be misleading. Circuit Judge
Wisdom stated that 124
Everyone knows that on TV all that glitters is not gold. On a black
and white screen, white looks grey and blue looks white: the lily
must be painted. Coffee looks like mud. Real ice cream melts
much more quickly than that firm but fake sundae. The plain
fact is, except by props and mock-ups some objects cannot be
shown on television as the viewer, in his mind's eye, knows the
essence of the objects.
At the time the Carter case was decided, the FTC was petitioning the
Supreme Court in another "mock-up" case-FTC v. Colgate Palmolive
Co. 125 This case was not a comparison, but rather the demonstration
of a shaving cream which softened "sandpaper" so that it could be
shaved within the space of the few minutes depicted in the ad. In
fact, the "sandpaper" was a plexi-glass mock-up, and while the shaving
cream could soften actual sandpaper so as to permit it to be shaved, it
required soaking for 80 minutes. Sandpaper could not be used on TV,
because it transmitted as the likeness of plain colored paper. The dem-
onstration was held to be misleading because of the undisclosed use of
the plexi-glass mock-up used in a manner so as to "prove" the product
claim. But in discussing mock-ups the Court stated that they were not
illegal per se, but only when presented as objective proof of the product
claim made. The example given was the use of mashed potatoes to de-
pict ice cream. There was no deception if shown only to indicate the
product. But if shown to demonstrate the rich texture of ice cream, it
is misleading. This case stands as the law today on the use of mock-ups
in advertising.
The FTC in dealing with disparagement has generally exhibited a
well reasoned approach which works to the benefit of the scrupulous
advertiser and the public. It is deemed to have expertise in dealing
with advertising matters,'126 and its findings are not reversed unless they
are based upon an improper construction of the law or are unsupported
by the evidence.
An FTC review of an alleged disparagement will provide an effec-
tive remedy for the injured businessman. There is no method, however,
for the businessman to assure such a review. The FTC may act upon
consumer or business complaints of unfair practices. There is no assur-
124. Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963).
125. 380 U.S. 374 (1964).
126. FTC v. Keppel, 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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ance that the complaints will be acted upon, particularly if the act does
not have wide effect on the public. Also, the acts, in order to be subject
to FTC jurisdiction, must involve interstate commerce.
B. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
The Uniform Act was adopted for the purpose of providing statutory
recognition to the developing law of "unfair competition." The act
deals principally with "passing-off" (deception of the consumer as to
source of product) and commercial disparagement. Slowly gaining in
acceptance, the act, or a revised version of it, has been adopted in
twelve states. 27
Provisions of the original act relating to disparagement provide that
it is a deceptive practice to "[disparage] the goods, services or business
of another by false or misleading representation of fact."'128 The revised
act as adopted in some states omits "misleading representation." It
provides that a person likely to be damaged by the deceptive trade prac-
tice may be granted an injunction, without the proof of loss of profits
or monetary damages, and also provides that costs and/or attorney's
fees may be assessed.
In providing that injunctive relief may be granted, the act clarifies
the existing law in some of the states which have adapted it and also
makes clear that "special damages" need not be proven in order to
obtain the injunction. Presumably equity's requirement of proving
irreparable harm by general proof remains in force. The act does not
provide for relief from disparaging statements of opinion. 12 9 Nor does
the amended version cover "misleading" statements of fact.
C. Other Proposals
The American Advertising Federation has drafted a Model State
Deceptive Practices Act.'30 The proposed statute follows the language
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, by declaring that "False, mis-
127. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws at 193 (1968). The act as approved in 1964 has been adopted in Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Oklahoma; revised 1966, adopted in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico and Ohio.
128. See, Ill. Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes, 3, 1212 Sales 311.
129. See generally, Note, Disparagement Under the Uniform Deceptive Practices Act,
51 Iowa L. Rev. 1066 (1966), and 56 Trademark Rptr. 911 (1966).
130. ADVERTISING AGE, November 25, 1968 at 26; see also, AAF False Ad Statute Praised
at FTC Probe, November 18, 1968 at 2.
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leading or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are unlawful." It further authorizes the state attorney gen-
eral to enforce the act by granting investigatory powers, and procedures
for the issuance of an injunction or acceptance of voluntary compliance.
The substantive law in the interpretation of "false, misleading or de-
ceptive" would be tied to the interpretations of the FTC and the Fed-
eral courts in interpreting Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC act131 as amended.
This type of act has been recommended by the FTC since 1966. The
essentials of the FTC proposal include enforcement by the State Attor-
ney General and guidance on the interpretation of the act provided by
the FTC and Federal Court decisions. A similar act was enacted in New
Jersey in 1960.132 The enforcement of the act by the Attorney General
places a victim of disparagement in the positon of being able to register
a complaint to the public official, but unable to invoke the statute him-
self as he can under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Pro-
posed changes to the draft suggested by the Council of State Govern-
ments would amend this. 133 Individuals who were injured by the un-
lawful acts could institute suits for the recovery of their own damages
and class actions for losses by others. While primarily intended to give
a remedy to aggrieved consumers, the language is broad enough to
permit a suit by a competitor injured by false and misleading dis-
paragement.
V. CONCLUSION
Practical remedies for the businessmen who have suffered a disparage-
ment are still not generally available. Common law actions for injunc-
tion are hampered by the reluctance of the courts to restrain free
speech and by the lingering association with common law defamation.
Actions for damages are limited by the special damage requirement. The
FTC has taken an effective and pragmatic approach when it has dealt
with disparagement, but its jurisdiction is limited and it is not neces-
sarily responsive to individual wrongs. The Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, while providing for injunctive relief based on actions
which may be instituted by the individual, have not been widely
adopted nor do they have a prohibition in the amended version against
misleading statements :that are disparaging. Also the interpretation of
131. 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(I).
132. 56 N.J. Stat. Ann. 8-2.
133. Suggested State Legislation for 1970.
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what constitutes "disparagement" may. develop upon quite disparate
lines in different jurisdictions.
A combination of the practical approach of the FTC in the de-
termination of actionable disparagement, and the Uniform Act's
provisions for institution of individual actions and injunctive re-
lief is needed. The model act as proposed by the A.A.F. and FTC
includes provisions for having the state courts guided by FTC and
Federal Court decisions on what constitutes actionable disparagement.
This would provide uniformity, and would substitute the FTC's exper-
tise for present state court analogies to defamation. Proposed provisions
for private suits should be written to include the right of the business
which has been disparaged to bring an action under the act. It is hoped
that this type of model act will achieve the wide acceptance needed to
fill this void in the law.
185
